

CORRUPTION, DE-RADICALISATION STRATEGIES AND BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH EAST, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Northeast Nigeria is gripped with the threats of terrorism, which is linked with bad leadership, poverty, unemployment, pervasive illiteracy and extreme deprivation. According to the report, over two million children either have lost their parents or have been separated from them due to insurgency and over fifteen thousand people have been killed. The need to ensure peace in the northeast has gained currency in the intellectual space. However, there has been insufficient interrogation of the relationship between corruption and deradicalisation process, including the effects of this relationship on Boko Haram insurgency in the north east, Nigeria. This article examined the effects of corruption on deradicalisation strategies of the government and the escalation of insurgency in the region. Using in-depth interviews, the article found evidence that the insurgents had more credible intelligence about the moves and strategies of the armed forces than the latter had on the former, and that military approach alone was inadequate. The findings revealed the dynamics of the relationship and existing social ties between the insurgents and the locals on the one hand and between the military and the locals on the other hand.

Keywords: Corruption, Deradicalisation, Insecurity, Insurgency, Terrorism

1. INTRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEM

The concept of radicalisation is a nebulous term that suffers conceptual plurality. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2009), conceives radicalization as the process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. In a similar vein, Danish Security and Intelligence Service (2009) defines radicalisation as a process, by which a person, to an increasing extent, accepts the use of undemocratic

or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective. Just like its twin concept, de-radicalisation is a fuzzy concept; it often appears to be understood as any effort aimed at preventing radicalisation from taking place (Bjørge&Horgan, 2009; Tom, 2013). De-radicalisation has been seen by scholars either as prevention of radicalization or de-programming of those already radicalised (Schmid, 2013). But much more is dichotomous situation between prevention (counter-radicalization) and deprogramming (de-radicalisation) (Wheat, 2011). While radicalization, according to Hoffman (1998), is 'programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence', counter-radicalisation is a process or programme aimed at and directed towards preventing radicalisation from taking place; it is a proactive approach against violent-based ideological orientations. It is a way of dissuading youth population from taking extreme position towards seeking social equality (Ariel, 2013; Richardson, 2006).

Of interest is the conceptual affinity between insurgency and terrorism. Scholars, commentators and stakeholders have confused the concepts, taking them to be the same, and in most cases, used them interchangeably. Insurgency is an interlocking system of actions - political, economic, psychological, and military - that aims at overthrowing the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime (Tomes, 2004). Insurgency is a rebellion against authority, directed at challenging the legitimacy of a constituted government and ultimately bringing down, in some extreme cases, a government of a state. Terrorism, as conceived by the United Nations, is any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act" (Juergensmeyer, 2000). The increasing transnational nature of terrorism and the danger posed by terrorist activities to international security has heightened emphasis on the capability of states in the international system to deal with present or potential threats within their respective territories (Schmid, 2013).

Over the years, different governments, individuals and institutions in Nigeria have systematically entrenched a culture of marginalisation and inequality within the social order (Arowolo, 2014). The institutionalization of the culture of marginalization and inequality finds its convincing alibi in the 1999 Nigerian constitution (as amended), so much that the constitution has given fillip to the entrenchment and sustenance of such culture. The constitutionally entrenched lopsided Nigeria's federal structure, along which modern governance is patterned and upon which revenue is shared among the component strata of the Nigerian state, is a fundamental basis of economic inequality and marginalization (Arowolo, 2013). This has engendered economic and socio-political depravity, which has, in turn, fanned ubiquitous violence, occasioned by a pervasively sustained frustrating aggression. The opulent behaviour and neopatrimonial tendencies of northern elites amid mass poverty have fostered a deep sense of popular grievance. Boko Haram initially emerged as a protest against the poor

governance and corruption of northern elites, which the movement sought to remedy through demands for an Islamic state and strict adherence to sharia law (Aro, 2013).

This widespread violence, arising from socio-economic deprivation, but sustained perpetually by state structures and institutions, has occasionally threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian state. Since Nigeria gained independence in October 1, 1960 from British suzerainty, it has been enmeshed in and grappled with economic, political and social crises with debilitating effects on national security. The civil war (1967-1970) that claimed more than three million lives, the Maitatsine religious riots of the 1980s and early 1990s, the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election, which was widely acclaimed to have been won by a Yoruba man in the Southwest Nigeria but denied by a Northern military demagogue and the crisis arising from the struggle to reclaim that mandate, Odi genocide, Sagamu bloody riots of 2000, the Niger Delta perennial crisis, armed robberies, inter and intra communal conflicts, kidnappings and political assassinations among others are altogether prominent breeding platforms for radicalization (Aiyede, 2016).

One major insurgent group that has shaken the root of Nigeria as a nation and has attracted massive international attention is Boko Haram. Scholars have argued, for instance, that Boko Haram has been in existence right from the 1960s but only started to draw attention in 2002 (Aro, 2013; Ekanem et al, 2012). It is on record that Boko Haram has been operating under the name Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation with Mallam Lawal as the leader since 1995 but leadership responsibility of the group later fell on Mallam Mohammed Yusuf when Mallam Lawal left Nigeria to continue his education in Saudi Arabia (Aro, 2013; Ekanem et al, 2012). It was the leadership of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf that allegedly opened the group to political influence and popularity (Aro, 2013). The official name of Boko Haram is: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which means "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad" (Aro, 2013; Ekanem et al, 2012). The group was nicknamed Boko Haram, a phrase in the local Hausa language connoting, "Western education is forbidden" (Aro, 2013). The founder of the group, Mohammed Yusuf, was an unrepentant critic of the northern hegemony and its neopatrimonialism. The drift of Boko Haram to violent extremism began after the death of Yusuf in police custody in 2009 (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2014).

The emergence of Boko Haram in 2009 has added to the dimension of violence and insecurity in the country. Of all the major issues that have negatively impacted the publicized image of the Nigerian state in the international arena since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-eastern part of the country ranks at fore. Such that it has altered the internal socio-political configuration of the three most affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, increased the number of internally displaced persons in these areas and neighboring regions, and, to a large extent, exposed the various military violations of human rights violations of the civilian population. Till date, the group continues to bedevil the country and immensely poses a threat to its national security and existence. As observed by Aro (2013), Boko Haram has introduced into the Nigerian public space a level of insurgency never witnessed before in Nigeria,

characterized by suicide bombings, roadside shootings, kidnapping and bomb attacks. Between 2009 and 2015, the sect has killed over 13,000 people, abducted over 2,000 women and girls and launched several attacks on civilian population, government institutions and worship centers around Northern Nigeria (Africa Check, 2015).

There has been tremendous increase in deaths arising from terrorism. Death tolls from terrorism increased by 80% in 2014 representing highest level of 32,685 deaths, compared to 18,111 in 2013. Boko Haram and ISIL alone were jointly responsible for 51% of all claimed global fatalities in 2014. Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria accounted for 78% and 57% respectively of all deaths and attacks that occurred in the world. Nigeria experienced the largest increase in terrorist activity with 7,512 deaths in 2014, an increase of over 300% since 2013. The global economic cost of terrorism reached an all-time peak at US\$52.9 billion. Since year 2000, there have been over 61,000 terrorist attacks, killing more than 140,000 people (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). This is a serious concern to this study, more so that there is a dearth of research on the relationship between corruption and de-radicalisation measures of government and the effects of such relationship on insurgency in the region. This work therefore investigates the influence and role of corruption in government's deradicalisation approaches as it affects Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east, Nigeria.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study adopts neopatrimonialism as a theoretical construct in the analysis of the processes of social structure that breeds and ultimately spreads insurgency in the north-east Nigeria. The literature on neopatrimonialism first manifested in the writing of Max Weber (1968), where patrimonialism was coined to conceptually dichotomize between legal and patrimonial- traditional and charismatic - authority (O'Neil, 2007). Weber's postulation has remained pivotal and has integrated the diverse understandings of development of postcolonial Africa, so much that it has provided a compass for explaining the source of patrimonialism in Africa. The term "neopatrimonialism", as used separately by Eisenstadt (1973), Bratton and van de Walle (1999), was construed to distinguish patrimonialism in traditional and modern contexts and symbolizes patrimonial practices subsisting in both formal and informal settings of societal structure (O'Neil, 2007).

The theory affirms that neopatrimonialism expresses itself through basic characteristics, fundamental to understanding the source(s) of behaviour and dynamics inherent in patrimonial states (O'Neil, 2007). Neopatrimonialism is a phenomenon that encourages a diffusion and suffusion of public and private spheres. It is a private appropriation of public spheres and the use of public resources for political relevance and legitimation. It does not only breed clientelism, nepotism and corruption but ultimately promotes mediocrity and sycophancy and displaces meritocratic tendencies (Anders, 2005). Nigeria and other African neopatrimonial states operate weak, agrarian economies driven by weak class formation with horizontally patterned lines of relationship ascriptively tied to primordially knit social

structure. This diffused and suffused social structure, devoid of functional differentiation, promotes appropriation, if not, misappropriation of resources for personal and family gains (O'Neil, 2007). The promotion of personalism, where power is concentrated in a group of individuals, who dominates the state machinery and apparatus and stands over and above the law, exemplifies leadership in Nigeria. This phenomenon clearly explains the case of socio-political and economic deprivation that prompted, in an unfettered exacerbation, the frustration that led to the radicalisation of some of Muslim youths in the north-east, Nigeria (Arowolo, 2015).

Military as a public service is designed to implement policies of government on security, including counter-insurgency, de-radicalization, and even intelligence gathering to pre-empt security threats that could lead to national insecurity of gargantuan proportion (Ekanem et al, 2012). But the military in Nigeria is faced with a lot of technical and financial constraints, especially during the period between 2009 and 2015 (Adeoye, 2015). This led to the debilitation of the military capacity and had allowed sporadic eruption of the Boko Haram insurgency. The core characteristic of neopatrimonialism - private appropriation of the public sphere - has devastating effect on the capacity, operation and performance of the military to engage in counter-insurgency that could effectively combat Boko Haram insurgency (Arowolo, 2014). Corruption, or institutional corruption, promoted by neopatrimonial tendencies, undermines the capacity of government to provide security and protect her territorial integrity as resources meant to procure arms and ammunitions were diverted for private use and for political patronage. State resources became personal property and there was relentlessly naked trend towards personalisation, if not personification, of state structures and its resources (Arowolo, 2010). The point of note is the famous \$2 billion arms scandal meant to procure arms for the armed forces, which was willfully shared among members of the then ruling party for political patronage at the heat of political campaigns in 2014 (BBC, 2015).

The relevance of the theory to the study therefore stems from its appreciation of private appropriation of public space for prebendal purposes. The study argues that the suffusion of public and private spheres, as corroborated by the central haunch of patrimonial thesis, explains the corruption in the process of de-radicalisation efforts of government. This has significantly derailed and clogged the deradicalisation measures of government and has escalated insurgency in the north-east.

3. STUDY AREAS AND METHODOLOGY

Research work for this study was carried out between September 2017 and March 2018 in three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Specifically, the study adopted In-depth Interview (IDI) to investigate factor(s) affecting government's de-radicalisation measures and escalation of Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east, Nigeria. Adamawa state has the largest number of ethnic groups in Nigeria (Ayu, 2014), comprising over eighty (80) ethnic groups, consisting of Animists, Christians and Muslims, drawn from a mosaic of ethnic groups with the population of three million, six hundred and seventy-five thousand (3,675,000) covering a landmass of about

36,917 square kilometres and is bordered by Borno state to the northwest, Gombe state to the west, Taraba to the southwest and Cameroon to the east. The second state is Borno State. Borno state was created in 1976, it is located in the northeastern Nigeria, comprising twenty-eight (28) ethnic nationalities, among which are: Kanuri, Shuwa-Arab, Hausa, Fulani, Babur, Bura, Chibok, Ngoshe, Guduf, Mandara, Garwegu, and Tera, consisting of both Muslims and Christians. It has population of four million, nine hundred and forty-four thousand (4,944,000) as at 2011 (NPC, 2011). The present Borno State, with the landmass of 69,435 sq. km, is bordered by Yobe from whom the latter was carved in 1991 (Aborisade and Mundt, 2001). Yobe, which is the third state under investigation, is as pluralistic and diverse as Borno with the population of two million, seven hundred and sixty-five thousand, three hundred (2,765,300) people (NPC, 2011), consisting of five major ethnic groups of Kanuri, Fulani, KareKare, Bade and Hausa, with a landmass of about 47,153 square kilometers (Ayu, 2014).

Ten (10) respondents each were chosen from government officials/security agencies and civil society organizations to examine de-radicalisation approaches of the government. The sample size was twenty (20), ten (10) each from security agencies and civil society organisations. Qualitative data, collected through in-depth interview, were analysed thematically. Data collated according to similarity in themes were analysed. The participants were purposively selected. The purposive selection was appropriate because it ensured precision. The main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a population that are of interest, which will best enable the researcher to answer his/her research questions (Small, 2009). The study ensured that the respondents were those considered as stakeholders and who were actively involved in solving the problems imposed by Boko Haram insurgency. Depth of knowledge of insurgency and de-radicalisation is a criterion for selecting respondents. Advocacy and human right-based organisations with deep-rooted knowledge in humanitarian assistance, emergency assistance and disaster relief were also considered.

4. DISCUSSION OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The study interrogated de-radicalization strategies of the government. In order to achieve the main objectives of this study, in-depth interviews were conducted with the major stakeholders involved in the counter-insurgency, de-radicalization and counter-radicalization. Discussions of findings are thematically presented below.

Specific Approaches of Counter-Insurgency

From the interviews conducted, there was no specific de-radicalisation approach prior to 2009. After the group had launched widespread attacks in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, the government, in a haphazard manner, instituted a joint military task force in 2009, codenamed Operation Restore Order (ORO) I and III to repel attacks of the insurgent group. In 2012, a moribund National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) was resuscitated to help adequately combat the virulent threat of Boko Haram insurgency and effectively prevent its spread to other areas. In addition to NFPT, the government

also established new permanent military units in two out of the three states. Another counter-insurgency approach taken by the government was the closure of Nigerian borders around the northeast, Nigeria in 2012, found to be extremely porous and as routes used by the insurgents to bring in arms and ammunitions. The government also considered the use of legal approach in its counter-insurgency strategy by enacting Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) in June, 2011 (Fieldwork, 2018).

Between 2009 and 2014, Nigerian armament base had been grossly plummeted, with military personnel suffering incurably from de-professionalisation and politicization; a military, whose technical capacity was not only weakened and depreciated but profoundly low in morale to defend the nation as evidenced in the seeming inability of the military to rescue the over 200 school girls kidnapped in Chibok community of Borno State and the over 100 school girls abducted in Dapchi. (Fieldwork, 2018). Office of the National Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was created as one of the strategies for counter-terrorism. On assumption of office on May 29, 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari introduced vigour into the counter-insurgency strategy of the military by establishing and relocating the Military Command Centre (MCC) to Borno State, the theatre of insurgency. In addition to this, President Buhari also resuscitated and invigorated Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Benin Republic was later coopted as a voluntary ally in the fight against insurgency). This marked the radical approach towards counter-insurgency. This is because the issue of insurgency and/or terrorism has an international dimension and the approach to tackle it should also be international in outlook.

De-radicalization measures

Government officials, involved in the reintegration, rehabilitation and settlement of both victims and defectors, spoke on a number of de-radicalisation measures by the government of Nigeria. According to them, Nigeria was providing a network of psychological services as a de-radicalization measure to both defectors and victims of insurgency. This psychology therapy process is considered mutually beneficial for the victims and defectors on the one hand, and for the government on the other hand. It will assist government in its intelligence gathering efforts, especially in the area of pre-empting attacks on public places, non-combatants and installations (Silverman, 2016). In addition to psychological therapy, a case-by-case, individual basis approach was adopted to rehabilitate and integrate both victims and defectors of the insurgency. According to Silverman (2016), those who have voluntarily defected from Boko Haram are provided with psychological therapy and are given tools for reintegration into Nigerian society, while those who were captured were made to go through criminal justice process in addition to the therapy provided. According to him, post-traumatic stress disorder care was provided for both groups. This is known as “soft approach to countering terrorism”.

The de-radicalisation programme in Nigeria aims at ensuring that the people reject in totality radical views and ideology and embrace a change of beliefs, views and

ideology of peace. The goal of the programme is to support the reintegration of former Boko Haram members back into society by providing psychological, emotional and educational supports (Anyadike, 2015). De-radicalisation programme of the Nigeria government was instituted by the Office of the National Security Adviser as the 2014 National Security Strategy; it aims at reducing recidivism and the re-integration of defector Boko Haram combatants back into the Nigerian society. The National Security Strategy has three major components which include: communication, counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation (Barkindo and Bryans, 2016). As part of its implementation measure, de-radicalisation programmes were established in Nigerian prisons, as part of the Safe Corridor programme, amnesty was offered to defector Boko Haram combatants. There are also initiatives to re-integrate former Boko Haram members into the Nigerian society (CDD, 2017).

The Nigerian prison launched its de-radicalisation programme in 2014. In 2015, several Boko Haram members were in prison and over fifty of them renounced their membership of the terrorist group while in detention (Hinshaw and McGroarty, 2017). They were given counseling support through the de-radicalisation initiatives of the government. (Hinshaw and McGroarty, 2017). Number of Boko Haram repentant in prisons, according to Ochulo (2017), has increased sporadically between 2014 and 2017 to over 900 members. Furthermore, the re-integration and the de-radicalisation programmes were expanded beyond the prison. In 2017, Nigeria's Chief of Defence Staff at a Stakeholders Forum in North-East stated that over one hundred ex-combatants in Gombe camp and more than five hundred children and women are going for a 3-month rehabilitation programme (Premium Times, 2016).

The success of the de-radicalisation and reintegration programme in Nigeria will not only depend on recidivist agenda of the government, embedded in its overall d-radicalisation philosophy, but much more on the type of social relationship the programme intends to produce; the aftermath of de-radicalisation, including spatial negotiation, spatial re-negotiation and spatial re-organisation of the socio-economic and political opportunities, as well as how well government handles resource allocation and re-allocation to the benefit of the reintegrated and de-radicalised members of the sect, without necessarily putting the other segments of the society at a disadvantage (Clubb & Tapley, 2018). The success, in synopsis, will depend on the ability of the government to successfully establish a benign rapprochement between the existing, non-radicalised members of the society and the re-integrated and de-radicalised members. The integration of former combatants into an environment with no fundamental economic blueprint and political reforms aimed at providing economic opportunities that could reduce the proclivity for extremism offers a hapless situation that may soon degenerate.

Challenges facing the security agencies towards combating Boko Haram insurgency

Porous coordination of intelligence gathering was identified as one of the factors affecting counterinsurgency approach of the government. Quality intelligence

gathering in support of the government's counterinsurgency efforts are inadequate and deficient. This has led to the situation in which the military personnel are being ambushed by the insurgents and a number of the Nigerian soldiers have lost their lives. Related to porosity of intelligence is the espionage, bickering and mutinous tendencies in the ranks of the military. The insurgents have spies among the military that give credible intelligence to Boko Haram. Seeming deficiency in forensic expertise and dearth of forensic facilities for crime prevention, crime detection and crime investigation in Nigeria is yet another major constraint hampering security agencies' performance in the fight against boko haram.

There is growing literature pointing in the direction of poverty and inequality as factors encouraging indoctrination of youths into insurgency in the northeast, Nigeria (Adenrele, 2012; Anyadike, 2013; Awojobi, 2014; Shuaibu et al, 2015). Why this may be reasonably true, it is not entirely correct to adduce the rise of radicalisation to poverty and inequality. This study found out that the religious and political dimensions to poverty and inequality define more appropriately the unfettered indoctrination experienced in the northeast. Corroborating the finding is the work of Meagher (2014) which supports the argument that the rise of Islamic terrorism is not simply a result of poverty and inequality, but of how these issues have been shaped by religious and political factors. According to him, other Muslim West African societies, such as those of Senegal and Niger, have higher levels of poverty and unemployment than Nigeria and a larger share of Muslims in their populations yet remain peaceful (Meagher, 2014).

Corruption was also identified as one of the factors militating against the effectiveness of security agencies in combating insurgency. There are two levels of corruption: corruption within the military and corruption within the political class. Political corruption nakedly manifested in the pilfering of the famous \$2.1 billion earmarked for arms procurement. The capacity of the military to effectively combat Boko haram insurgency was plummeted as a result of corruption. Military corruption manifested in the mounting of roadblocks to prevent the flow of insurgents and arms from one place to another, but these roadblocks soon became sources of corruption as masses and commuters were being extorted by security agents. It was also discovered that the military were using the points to violate human rights by subjecting citizens to all forms of torture on slight provocation. These acts of extortion and violation of human rights have alienated the people from the military and have created hostile and suspicious relationship as well as mutual distrust between the military and the locals. Lack of cooperation from the local population made it difficult for military to gather credible intelligence. Boko Haram members live among the community but the locals are too scared, apathetic or unwilling to inform security agencies about clandestine moves of the insurgents (Fieldwork, 2018). This is the most important factor preventing the defeat of book haram insurgency; corruption within and without and its effects on the de-radicalisation measures as well as Boko Haram insurgency.

4. CONCLUSION

The study examined the relationship between corruption and de-radicalisation strategies of the government, covering the gamut of issues around reintegration, rehabilitation and resettlement of both victims of and defectors from Boko Haram, and its effects on the insurgency. The study found out that Boko Haram insurgency posed tremendous threat to Nigeria's national security. Despite various approaches and strategies designed for counter-insurgency, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, the insurgency still thrived unabated. The number, sophistication, geographical range, and array of targets that have been successfully attacked by Boko Haram have increased since 2009. Boko Haram has also expanded its base beyond Nigeria's borders and established links with other violent extremist groups within the region and other parts of the world (Fieldwork, 2018).

The Nigerian government's reliance on military might to fight Boko Haram did not yield the desired result. The study found out that Boko Haram had more credible intelligence on the operations of the Nigerian military than the Nigerian military had on Boko Haram's operations. This is evidenced in the seeming frosty relationship between the locals and the security agencies. The relationship is based on and sustained by mutual suspicion, distrust and apathy, the genesis of which was the military's recklessness in terms of extortion, human right abuse and sexual harassment. The two pronged problems of plummeted capacity of the military and its potent lack of intelligence are a result of corruption, corruption within the armed forces, which are responsible for the responsibility of implementing national security policy and political corruption among the political class who formulates national security policy. As a result of corruption from within the armed forces and without it, deradicalisation process became derailed and escalation of the insurgency became imminent.

In order to roll back insurgency escalation, community mobilization is imperative. Government can do this by addressing mistrust, distrust, apathy and suspicion between the locals and security agents. Genuine reconciliation and confidence building between the armed forces and locals are desirable. Enlightenment campaign is also imperative. There should be mass enlightenment campaign in several dialects in order to effectively enlighten the locals and mobilize them towards defeating the insurgency. Girl and child education should be taken seriously in order to ensure that level of ignorance is reduced in the region on a sustainable basis. Skills acquisition programmes should be designed particularly for youths and women in order to empower them economically.

Anti-graft agencies in Nigeria should focus on how to rid the various IDPs of corruption in order to ensure seamless process of reintegration, rehabilitation, resettlement and de-radicalisation. As government strives more to combat the growing virulence of extremism in the northeast, the most potent approach, in the opinion of this study, would be to democratize the counter-insurgency approach of the government by engaging in street-level, bottom-up approach to counter-terrorism. In view of the inadequacy and incapacitation of the military approach, there is the need

for deeper and meaningful community engagement and involvement in the management of IDPs, reintegration, rehabilitation, resettlement and de-radicalisation. Allowing community to own the process will not only be more effective and efficient, but more enduring and sustainable. Inter-agency rivalry is a common feature of the Nigerian security architecture. It was one of the major factors impeding the performance of the security agencies. It is recommended that there should be clear-cut definition of operational roles of each security agency engaged in the fight against insurgency. The need to overhaul the entire intelligence architecture of Nigeria for effective and optimal performance is germane. This is necessary in order to effectively pre-empt the steps and attacks of Boko haram. Priority should be given to professionalisation of the armed forces. This will depoliticize them and make them function effectively.

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